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Abstract
Cognitive satellite-terrestrial networks (STNs) have been recognized as the promising architecture for addressing
spectrum scarcity in the next generation communication networks. In this letter, we investigate the secure transmission
schemes in the cognitive STNs where the interference from terrestrial base station (BS) is introduced to enhance
security of the satellite link. Our objectives are to minimize the transmit power by jointly optimizing the cooperative
beamforming and artificial noise (AN) while guaranteeing the secrecy rate constraint for satellite link, the information
rate constraint for terrestrial link and the total transmit power constraint. Both scenarios of the perfect and imperfect
channel cases are respectively considered. These constraints make the optimization problems formulated non-convex
and challenging, which are efficiently solved via certain transformations to be formulated more tractable versions,
respectively. Numerical results are provided to corroborate the proposed schemes.
Index Terms
Cognitive satellite-terrestrial networks, security, cooperative beamforming, perfect and imperfect channel state
information (CSI).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the communication performance of the satellite networks are impacted by the masking effects
between the satellite (SAT) and terrestrial nodes, the emerging cognitive satellite-terrestrial networks (STNs)
are expected to bring many exciting applications, ranging from the utilization of scarce satellite spectrum
resource to security improvements [1]. The promising network architecture allows the satellite network and
the terrestrial network operating at the same frequency band, which offers new possibilities and challenges
[2].
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2Recently, the concept of cognitive STNs as a new paradigm has been investigated [3]–[5]. To be specific,
[3] first studied a resource management scheme in the novel architecture, while the cognitive exploitation
mechanisms were presented in [4] for both the forward link and return link scenarios. Considering the
real-time applications in the cognitive STNs, [5] discussed two power control schemes for maximizing the
delay-limited capacity and outage capacity of satellite user.
Owing to the broadcasting nature and inherent openness of the satellite networks, any receiver situated
within the coverage of the SAT can naturally receive the transmitted signal. As a result, the security issues
are of paramount importance in the satellite communications, especially in military applications [6], [7].
In recent years, physical-layer security (PLS), which is based on the physical-layer characteristics of the
wireless channels, has been proposed to realize secure communications. The concept of PLS was firstly
applied to satellite communications by Lei et al. [6]. Then, Zheng et al. [7] designed an optimal transmit
beamforming scheme to realize secure transmission of multibeam satellite communications and Yan et al. [8]
proposed a secure transmit design in the satellite-terrestrial relay networks. On the other hand, the PLS in the
cognitive STNs have also been attracted substantial attentions. Specially, Yuan et al. [9] designed the optimal
beamforming jointly in the cognitive STNs for maximizing the secrecy rate of primary user (PU), while the
secrecy performance of PU was analyzed in [1] under two realistic scenarios, i.e., the CSI of eavesdropper
was available or unavailable at SAT. However, applications of PLS in cognitive STNs are relatively limited,
and this motivates our current works.
In this letter, we focus on the secure cooperative transmission scheme for the cognitive STNs, where the
satellite network acts as primary network and the terrestrial network acts as secondary network. Unlike [7],
[9], the eavesdropper (Eve) has multiple antennas and the artificial noise (AN) is embed at the terrestrial
BS in our design to guarantee the PU. Furthermore, in order to study a more realistic scenario, the case
of imperfect CSI is further investigated. Our design objectives are to minimize the transmit power while
satisfying secrecy rate constraint at the PU, information rate constraint at the secondary user (SU) and the
total transmit power constraint. To the best of our knowledge, such work has not been tackled hitherto. The
power minimization problems formulated are non-convex and challenging, which are handled relying on
advanced matrix inequality.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The forward link cognitive STN under spectrum sharing is considered in Fig. 1, where the satellite network
corresponding to primary network shares the same spectrum with the terrestrial network corresponding to
secondary network. The SAT is equipped with Nt antennas (feeds) and geostationary, communicating with a
satellite terminal (i.e., PU) in the presence of a Ne-antenna Eve which just eavesdrops the satellite signal. The
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3terrestrial BS with Ns antennas sends signal to a terrestrial terminal (i.e., SU), while the signal transmitted
by the terrestrial BS can be seen as interference to the satellite link. The PU and SU are equipped with single
antenna each. Note that the worst-case scenario for eavesdropping under the multi-antenna Eve is taken into
account. The satellite network and terrestrial network are assumed to be operated at the S/L band.
A. Channel Model
For practical purposes, the satellite links are assumed to experience widely-adopted Shadowed-Rician
fading [1] and the terrestrial links undergo the correlated Rayleigh fading. Specially, the channels for the
satellite links can be respectively modeled as
hi =
√
b(ϕi)h˜i, He =
√
b(ϕe)H˜e, (1)
with
b(ϕ) =
(
J1(u)
2u
+ 36
J3(u)
u3
)2
, u = 2.07123
sinϕ
sinϕ3dB
, (2)
h˜i = A exp(jψi) + Z exp(jφi), H˜e = A exp(jψe) + Z exp(jφe), (3)
where b(ϕ) is the corresponding beam gain factor, which is determined by their location. ϕ is the angle
between the corresponding receiver and the beam center, and ϕ3dB is the 3-dB angle. J1(·) and J3(·) represent
the first-kind Bessel function of order 1 and 3. h˜i ∈ CNt×1 (i = {p, s}) denotes the channel fading vector
from SAT to the receiver i and H˜e ∈ CNt×Ne denotes the channel fading matrix from SAT to Eve, which
include the scattering and the line-of-sight (LOS) components. ψ ∈ [0, 2π) denotes the stationary random
phase and φ denotes the deterministic phase of the LOS component.
On the other hand, the terrestrial channel vectors, using the well-known Kronecker model, are modeled as
gi = R
1
2
i g˜i, Ge = R
1
2
e G˜e, (4)
where g˜i ∈ CNs×1 (i ∈ {p, s}) denotes the channel vector from the terrestrial BS to receiver i and G˜e ∈
CNs×Nr denotes the channel matrix from the terrestrial BS to Eve, which all follow Rayleigh fading. Ri
and Re are the corresponding correlation matrices given by simulation section. Following [1], we assume
that the terrestrial BS is equipped with uniform linear antenna (ULA) array, and the correlation matrix
Ri, (i = {p, e, s}) with (m,n)-th element is given by
[Ri]m,n ≈
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
exp
[
−j2π(m− n)∆θi
d
λ
sin θi
]
dθ (5)
where θi denotes the angle-of departure (AOD) and ∆θi denotes the angle spread, d is the minimum inter-
element spacing and λ is the carrier wavelength.
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Fig. 1. The cognitive satellite-terrestrial networks.
B. Problem Formulation
Let xp ∈ CNt×1 and xs ∈ CNs×1 be the transmitted signal vectors at SAT and terrestrial BS, where
xp ∼ CN (0,Qp) is the transmit covariance matrix of xp. To provide the stronger distortions to Eve, the
AN is adopted at terrestrial BS namely, xs = s + z, where s ∼ CN (0,Qs), Qs is the transmit covariance
matrix of s. In addition, z ∼ CN (0,Qz) is the AN vector artificially invoked by terrestrial BS. Note that Qz
represents the transmit covariance matrix of z. Then, the received signals at PU, Eve and SU are expressed,
respectively, as
yp = h
H
p xp + g
H
p s+ g
H
p z+ np, (6)
ye = H
H
e xp +G
H
e s +G
H
e z+ ne, (7)
ys = g
H
s s + g
H
s z+ h
H
s xp + ns, (8)
where ni ∼ CN (0, σ2i ) (i ∈ {p, s}) and ne ∼ CN (0Nr , σ
2
eINr) denote additive white Gaussian noises at the
receiver i and Eve, respectively.
According to [1], [7], the secrecy rate of PU is defined as
Rsec,p =
[
Cp(Qp,Qs,Qz)− Ce(Qp,Qs,Qz)
]+
, (9)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Cp(Qp,Qs,Qz) and Ce(Qp,Qs,Qz) denote the information rates at PU and Eve,
respectively, i.e.,
Cp(Qp,Qs,Qz) = log2
(
1 +
hHp Qphp
gHp (Qs +Qz)gp + σ
2
p
)
, (10)
Ce(Qp,Qs,Qz) = log2 det
(
I+
HHe QpHe
GHe (Qs +Qz)Ge + σ
2
eI
)
. (11)
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5Following the study of [9], [10], the secondary network can access the spectrum licensed to PU when the
PLS of the primary network is guaranteed. In the considered scenario, the transmit power of the information
signal is minimized subject to the secrecy rate constraint at PU, the information rate constraint at SU and
the total transmit power constraint such that the AN transmit power is maximized for secrecy consideration.
As a result, the described problem is formulated as
min
Qp0,Qs0,Qz0
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) (12a)
s.t. Cp(Qp,Qs,Qz)− Ce(Qp,Qs,Qz) ≥ τp, (12b)
log2
(
1 +
gHs Qsgs
gHs Qzgs + h
H
s Qphs + σ
2
s
)
≥ τs, (12c)
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) + Tr(Qz) ≤ Pth, (12d)
where τp and τs represent the prescribed secrecy rate target at PU and information rate target at SU,
respectively. Pth is the maximum transmit power of the network. The problem (12) is not convex in terms
of its constraints (12b) and (12c), which cannot be solved efficiently. In order to circumvent this non-convex
issue, we propose a joint design of the transmit covariance matrices and AN matrix to relax this problem as
the convex optimization framework in the following.
III. SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN
In this section, the perfect CSI case is first studied where full CSI of all users is assumed to be perfectly
known at SAT and terrestrial BS. This assumption has been widely adopted in [7], [9]. Then, the research
is further extended to the imperfect CSI case, in which the CSI of PU and Eve is unknown at terrestrial BS
since the PU and Eve belong to the satellite network.
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6A. Perfect CSI
Assuming all CSI is known perfectly at SAT and terrestrial BS, by introducing a slack variable β, problem
(12) is equivalently rewritten as
min
Qp0,Qs0,Qz0,β
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) (13a)
s.t. log2
(
1 +
hHp Qphp
gHp (Qs +Qz)gp + σ
2
p
)
− log2 β ≥ τp, (13b)
det
(
I+
HHe QpHe
GHe (Qs +Qz)Ge + σ
2
eI
)
≤ β, (13c)
log2
(
1 +
gHs Qsgs
gHs Qzgs + h
H
s Qphs + σ
2
s
)
≥ τs, (13d)
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) + Tr(Qz) ≤ Pth. (13e)
where log2 β can be interpreted as the maximal allowable mutual information for Eve. To circumvent the
difficulty of constraint (13c), we use the following lemma whose proof can be found in [11].
Lemma 1: The following implication holds
det
(
I+
HHe QpHe
GHe (Qs +Qz)Ge + σ
2
eI
)
≤ β (14)
=⇒ (β − 1)
(
GHe (Qs +Qz)Ge + σ
2
eI
)
−HHe QpHe  0 (15)
for any Ge ∈ CNs×Nr , He ∈ CNt×Nr , Qp  0, Qs  0 and Qe  0. Furthermore, the equivalence in (14)
and (15) hold if rank(Qp) ≤ 1 and rank(Qs) ≤ 1.
Replacing (14) with (15), the optimization problem given by (12) is reformulated as
min
Qp0,Qs0,Qz0,β
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) (16a)
s.t. Tr (αGp(Qs +Qz)) + Tr(HpQp) + ασ
2
p ≥ 0, (16b)
(β − 1)
(
GHe (Qs +Qz)Ge + σ
2
eI
)
−HHe QpHe  0, (16c)
Tr (Gs(Qs − γQz))− γ
(
Tr(HsQp) + σ
2
s
)
≥ 0, (16d)
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) + Tr(Qz) ≤ Pth, (16e)
where α = 1 − β2τp and γ = 2τs − 1, meanwhile Hp = hph
H
p , Gp = hph
H
p , Hs = hsh
H
s and Gs = gsg
H
s .
Notably, we observe that the problem given by (16) is a convex SDP problem when β is fixed, which can
be efficiently solved by the interior point method [12]. Then, the one-dimensional linear search is performed
to find the optimal β∗ from the interval [1, 1 + Pth||hp||
2].
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7B. Extension to Imperfect CSI
Since PU and Eve are the users of the satellite network, it is very difficult for the terrestrial BS to obtain
accurate CSI of PU and Eve. Thus, the CSI imperfectness between BS-PU and BS-Eve links has to be
taken into consideration in the network design. In this setup, the imperfect CSI from BS to PU and Eve are
modeled, respectively, as
gp = gˆp +∆gp, Ge = Gˆe +∆Ge, (17)
where gˆp and gˆe are the nominal channel vectors. And ∆gp and ∆ge denote the channel estimation errors,
which are respectively bounded by
‖∆gp‖2 = ‖gp − gˆp‖2 ≤ ǫp, ‖∆Ge‖F = ‖Ge − Gˆe‖F ≤ ǫe, (18)
where ǫp and ǫe represent the non-negative channel error bounds.
Based on (17) and (18), the robust secure transmission for minimizing total transmit power is designed.
Mathematically, the joint optimization problem is expressed as
min
Qp0,Qs0,Qz0,β¯
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) (19a)
s.t. min
‖∆gp‖2≤ǫp
hHp Qphp + g
H
p (Qs +Qz)gp + σ
2
p
β¯
(
gHp (Qs +Qz)gp + σ
2
p
) ≥ 2τp, (19b)
max
‖∆Ge‖F≤ǫe
det
(
I+
HHe QpHe
GHe (Qs +Qz)Ge + σ
2
eI
)
≤ β¯, (19c)
Tr (Gs(Qs − γQz))− γ
(
Tr(HsQp) + σ
2
s
)
≥ 0, (19d)
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) + Tr(Qz) ≤ Pth, (19e)
where β¯ is the introduced variable similar to the perfect case. Note that problem (19) is costly to solve
globally since there infinitely many constraints in (19b) and (19c). To make problem (19) computationally
tractable, we convert these robust constraints into linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) relying on advanced
matrix inequality results.
To proceed, applying S-Procedure [12] and introducing a slack variable µp ≥ 0, we convert (19b) into an
LMI given by (20)
Γp(Qp,Qs,Qz, β¯, µp) =

µpINs + α¯(Qs +Qz) α¯(Qs +Qz)gˆp
gˆHp α¯(Qs +Qz) gˆ
H
p α¯(Qs +Qz)gˆp + h
H
p Qphp + α¯σ
2
p − µpǫ
2
p

 (20)
where α¯ = 1 − β¯2τp . Then, to circumvent this difficulty of constraint (19c), we introduce the following
lemma, i.e., the extension of S-Procedure [13].
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8Lemma 2 (Luo-Sturm-Zhang [13]): Let f(X) = XHAX+XHB+BHX+C and D  0, the following
equivalence holds if there exists a µe ≥ 0:
f(X)  0, ∀X ∈ {X|Tr(DXXH) ≤ 1}
⇐⇒

C BH
B A

− µe

I2 0
02 D

  0 (21)
Based on Lemma 3, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The following implication holds
max
‖∆Ge‖F≤ǫe
det
(
I+
HHe QpHe
GHe (Qs +Qz)Ge + σ
2
eI
)
≤ β¯ (22)
=⇒ Γe(Qp,Qs,Qz, β¯, µe)  0 (23)
where Γe(Qp,Qs,Qz, β¯, µe) is given by
Γe(Qp,Qs,Qz, β¯, µe) =

(β¯ − 1− µe)INr + Gˆ
H
e
[
(β¯ − 1)(Qs +Qz)
]
Gˆe −H
H
e QpHe Gˆ
H
e (β − 1)(Qs +Qz)
(β¯ − 1)(Qs +Qz)Gˆe (β¯ − 1)(Qs +Qz) +
µe
ǫ2
p
INs

 (24)
Furthermore, the equivalence in (22) and (23) hold if rank(Qp) ≤ 1 and rank(Qz) ≤ 1. Due to the space
limitation, we omit the proof, which can be referred to [11, Proposition 2] for more details.
Replacing (19b) and (19c) with (20) and (24), problem (19) can be relaxed to the following problem as
min
Qp,Qs,Qz ,β¯,µp,µe
Tr(Qp) + Tr(Qs) (25a)
s.t. (19d), (19e), (20), (24), (25b)
Qp  0, Qs  0, Qz  0. (25c)
Noticeably, problem (25) is a convex SDP when β¯ is fixed, which can be efficiently solved by a standard
optimization solver, e.g. CVX [12]. Then, the one-dimensional linear search is performed to find the optimal
β∗ from the interval [1, 1 + Pth||hp||2].
Remark 1: For the two cases, if the optimal solutions Q∗p and Q
∗
s are rank-one, the optimal beamforming
vectors can be obtained via eigenvalue decomposition. Surprisingly, as observed from the simulations with
1000 randomly generated channel realizations, the obtained optimal solutions Q∗p and Q
∗
s for the relaxed (16)
are always rank-one. Also, the obtained rank-one optimal solutions Q∗p and Q
∗
s for the relaxed (25) are about
99% and 91.4%, respectively. Alternatively, Gaussian randomization is applied to obtain the approximate
solutions.
Complexity Analysis: According to [12], the main computational complexity for solving problem (16) is
O
(
34(N
1/2
s +N
1/2
t )
)
log2
(
1
ε
)
, and for solving problem (25) isO
(
(Ns + 1)
1/2 + (Ns +Nr)
1/2 + (N
1/2
s +N
1/2
t )
)
log2
(
1
ε
)
, respectively, where ε is the given accuracy.
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Fig. 2. Average transmit power versus secrecy rate threshold at PU with 2τs = 10.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed schemes. The SAT is assumed to be equipped
with Nt = 4 antennas (feeds) to cover the network. The number of antennas equipped at terrestrial BS and
Eve are Ns = 4 and Nr = 2, respectively. The satellite links experience heavy shadowing with parameters
(bi, mi,Ωi) = (0.063, 2, 8.97 × 10−4), ∀i ∈ {p, e, s}. The beam angles from SAT to PU, to Eve and to SU
are set as 0.01◦, 0.8◦ and 30◦, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that the noise powers are identical as
σ2p = σ
2
e = σ
2
s = 1 and we set ǫp = ǫe = ǫ and Pth = 60W, d =
λ
2
, θs = 0
◦, θp = 40
◦, and ∆θs = ∆θe = 5
◦.
Fig. 2 shows the total transmit power comparison of the proposed cooperative beamforming scheme,
without AN scheme and a fixed allocation scheme (as a benchmark). As expected, we can clearly see that
the proposed design schemes with AN outperform the benchmark schemes for the same secrecy rate threshold
τp saving over 2 dBW in the secrecy regions due to the optimized transmission. Furthermore, we can observe
that a higher power consumption is required for the imperfect CSI than that under the perfect CSI case. As
channel error ǫ increases, the performance loss becomes larger, which implies that the robust design scheme
is very sensitive to the CSI accuracy. In addition, it can be interestingly observed that the proposed optimal
schemes with and without AN are almost the same. This is due to the fact that the main advantage of using
AN can be utilized to reduce the number of required antenna at terrestrial BS when existing at least two
eavesdroppers (or visualized as a multi-antenna Eve), according to the Theorem 2 in [7].
Fig. 3 plots the total transmit power versus information rate requirement at SU under τp = 2 b/s/Hz. The
curves in Fig. 3 demonstrate that the total transmit power increases with the increasing of 2τs . This is mainly
due to the fact that, with increasing 2τs , more power will be used to satisfy the minimum information rate
requirement for SU.
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Fig. 3. Average transmit power versus information rate requirement at SU.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter, we investigated the secure cooperative transmission scheme for the cognitive STNs with the
objective of minimizing the transmit power of information signal, while satisfying the required constraints.
Both the perfect and imperfect CSI were considered in the design. Simulation results showed that the proposed
schemes have a good performance in guaranteeing secure transmission.
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